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ABSTRACT  
 
In the recent past, there have been several initiatives by major network providers such 
as Turk Telekom lead the industry towards network capacity distribution in Turkey. In this 
study, we use a monopoly pricing model to examine the optimal pricing strategies for “pay-
per-volume” and “pay-per-time” based leasing of data networks. Traditionally, network 
capacity distribution includes short/long term bandwidth and/or usage time leasing. Each 
consumer has a choice to select volume based pricing or connection time based pricing. 
When customers choose connection time based pricing, their optimal behavior would be 
utilizing the bandwidth capacity fully therefore it can cause network to burst. Also, offering 
pay-per-volume scheme to the consumer provides the advantage of leasing the excess 
capacity for other potential customers for network provider.  
 
We examine the following issues in this study:  
(i) What are the extra benefits to the network provider for providing the volume based pricing 
scheme? and  
(ii) Does the amount of demand (number of customers enter the market) change?  
 
The contribution of this paper is to show that pay-per-volume is a viable alternative for 
a large number of customers, and that judicious pricing for pay-per-volume is profitable for 
the network provider. 
 
Keywords: telecommunication networks, time based network pricing, volume based network 
pricing, optimization  
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Introduction and Related Literature 
 
Customers can use networks for video conferencing, voice over TCP/IP and data 
applications, which we will call tasks. As (Kasap et al. 2007) stated, in general, two types of 
tasks are performed using data networks. A task is time-fixed (real-time, size compressible) if 
its size can be changed without disrupting its completion but the transmission time cannot be 
compressed or extended. Most audio/video tasks are time-fixed. A task is size-fixed (time 
compressible) if all bits have to be transmitted but the duration is not fixed. Most data 
applications such as file transfer, database transactions are of this category. All types of 
applications use bandwidth and manage time. Traditionally, network capacity distribution 
includes short/long term bandwidth and/or usage time leasing. 
   
In the recent past, there have been several initiatives by major network providers such 
as Turk Telekom lead the industry towards network capacity distribution in Turkey. In this 
study, we use a monopoly pricing model to examine the optimal pricing strategies for “pay-
per-volume” and “pay-per-time” based leasing of data networks.  
 
Earlier researches show that the connection billing model has a great effect on how 
people consume online data and how satisfied they are with the connection and online 
services. Today there are various billing models for quality-differentiated Internet access as a 
function of bandwidth, traffic volume, applications, and pricing structure which is based 
either on time, volume, a combination of both, or a flat-rate, bandwidth efficiency 
optimizations guaranteed QoS, uniform pricing, multipart pricing and nonlinear pricing on 
total call time or the number of packets exchanged (Masuda and Whang, 2006; Kasap et al., 
2007). 
 
However, there are several other pricing strategies (Keon and Anandalingam, 2005) that 
are examined in lots of sources. Some of them are “Paris-metro pricing (similarly time of day 
pricing)”, “priority pricing”, “smart-market pricing”, “top-percentile pricing” (Levy et al., 
2006), some parts of these pricing methodologies are usage-based, and other part of that are 
volume-based strategies. 
 
In today’s billing strategies vary in different countries. Volume-dependent charges have 
been used by some providers in the past. It’s the system that costumers are billed according to 
content downloaded. There are some resources claimed that it has lost popularity in recent 
years. Volume-based strategies are decreasing the consumers’ interest and usage regarding 
that. It could seem to costumers so complex. These complexities frighten consumers (Stiller 
et al., 2001). Despite that aspect, some researches argue that the greatest advantage of 
volume-based pricing for operators is that the uncertainty and risk of consumption remains 
with the customer, rather than the operator, which can pro rata bills according to the data 
volumes transferred (Biggs and Kelly, 2006). The pay-per-volume context is evaluated in 
many kind of aspect within some papers (Kim, 2006; Bouras and Sevasti, 2004; Altman et 
al., 1999; Levy et al., 2006). 
 
The welfare and demand of consumers are estimated for seeking the effective 
bandwidth with guaranteed QoS in many sources (Courcoubetis et al., 2000; Ganesh et al., 
2007; Naiksatam et al., 2007; Charmantzis et al., 1996; Keon et al., 2003). Apart from these 
resources, to evaluate the characteristic of telecommunication demand in a competitive 
market, there are several investigations to make welfare analysis by aggregating demand 
(Aldebert et al., 2004; Dhebar and Oren, 1986; Ganesh et al., 2007; Altman et al., 1999). 
 
The main other broadband pricing strategies practiced by operators is a time-based 
pricing strategy, called pay-per-time. According to this point of view, consumers spent online 
time is charged per unit. There is various kind of service to serve different classes of speed 
(Jain and Kannan, 2002; Altman et al., 1999; Biggs and Kelly, 2006). 
 
When providers offer connection time and volume based pricing schemes, each 
consumer has a chance to select one of them. If customers have more time-fixed tasks in their 
agenda and select connection time based pricing, they can plan (schedule) their task and 
increase the volume of the task by increasing transmission rate in order to realize better 
audio/visual quality. Also they incur the same cost since the connection time has not been 
changed even transmission rate has been increased; therefore, customers can manage costs 
more effectively. In addition, when customers choose connection time based pricing, their 
optimal behavior would be utilizing the bandwidth capacity fully (they can transmit another 
task simultaneously), therefore their behavior can cause network to burst. Offering the pay-
per-volume based pricing to the consumer can prevent bursting. The main advantage of pay-
per-volume pricing scheme is independently from how long the task takes to manage; the 
customer would pay for the total volume used. In addition, if customers have more size-fixed 
tasks in their agenda, they can plan (schedule) their task and manage costs more effectively, 
because most of the size fixed tasks are divisible, and the customer can schedule a task in 
different reasonable times. However, the optimal behaviors of the customers who choose the 
pay-per-volume pricing scheme generally encourages them to send only just enough bytes for 
time-fixed tasks, and this situation can cause quality of the task to decrease, so it can create 
an opportunity cost. Therefore, if the provider set a reasonable pay-per unit volume price to 
compensate this opportunity cost, it can encourage some of the potential customers, who 
normally prefer not to use the network, to enter the market. That’s why we examine the 
following issues in this study: (i) what are the extra benefits to the network provider for 
providing the volume based pricing scheme? And (ii) does the amount of demand (number of 
customers enter the market) change? 
 
In the next section, we discuss the model assumptions and present the formulation. 
Then, we present an optimization model and determine the optimal pricing strategy. Finally, 
we conclude and discuss future research.   
 
 
Model Assumptions and Formulation 
 
In this section, we discus the model assumptions and formulate the model. In order to 
examine the optimal pricing strategies for pay-per-time and pay-per-volume leasing of data 
networks, we adapt the monopoly pricing model for software dissemination of Gurnani and 
Karlapalem (2001) to network pricing strategies. Gurnani and Karlapalem (2001) developed a 
monopoly pricing model to examine the optimal pricing strategies for selling and pay-per-use 
licensing of packaged software over the Internet. Different from their model, customers can 
lease the network with different pricing strategies as time and volume based. Also, we 
assume that the marginal cost of network services is constant, and therefore all prices are 
assumed to be net of marginal cost. Pricing decisions with multiple network providers or 
multiple competing network capacity would result in a game-theoretic problem formulation, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper.    
  
Each consumer has the chance of selecting “pay-per-time” pricing scheme or “pay-per-
volume” pricing scheme offered. We define 1Ω  as the “pay-per-time” pricing scheme, 2Ω  as 
the “pay-per-volume” pricing scheme offered to the customer. Further let 1q  be the demand 
for 1Ω , 2q  be the demand for 2Ω , and tc  be the cost of using network per unit time and xc  
be the unit transmission cost of data carried over network per unit time.  
 
The traditional model used to categorize providers assumes that there is a continuum of 
consumers indexed by the reservation prices [0,1]r∈ , with r  distributed uniformly in the 
unit interval.  
 
In our model, we consider the case that the consumer has the choices of pay-per-time 
and pay-per-volume based pricing. Therefore, not only consumers’ reservation prices effects 
their network leasing decision but also the benefit derived from network usage effects their 
decision. When we talk about network usage, we must consider two dimensions. While using 
the network, customers occupy some capacity of the network throughout the connected time. 
Therefore, we adopt a three dimensional classification where each consumer indexed 
by ( , , )x t r , where [0,1]r∈ , as before, represents the reservation price, [0,1]x∈  represents the 
usage level of network capacity for the customers, and [0,1]t∈  represents the usage level of 
the transmission time for customers, and they are also assumed to be uniformly distributed 
over the unit interval. With this new classification, we can consider consumers with different 
combinations of high/low reservation prices and high/low usage levels of time and volume as 
in Figure 1. 
 
Sending more bytes during an audio/video conference that is time-fixed task can 
increase the quality of the conference, that’s why choosing the pay-per-time pricing scheme 
can be more advantageous for these type of tasks. So, we can assume that the benefit of using 
the network is higher for the consumers choosing pay-per-time pricing scheme compared to 
selecting per-per-volume pricing. In addition, the optimal behaviors of the customers who 
choose the pay-per-time pricing scheme generally encourages them to use all available 
bandwidth so that they can increase the quality of task by increasing the size of it or they can 
transmit another task simultaneously, and this situation can cause networks to burst. In order 
to prevent the bursting of networks, providers generally set pay-per-time unit price higher to 
discourage some of their customers from choosing pay-per-time pricing scheme. The optimal 
behaviors of the customers who choose the pay-per-volume pricing scheme generally 
encourages them to send only just enough bytes for time fixed tasks, however this situation 
can cause quality of the task to decrease, and so it can create an opportunity cost. Therefore 
the reservation price of the customers for the pay-per-volume pricing strategy, and the benefit 
of using the network for the customers choosing pay-per-volume pricing scheme would be 
lower.  
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Consumer index 
 
 
Most data applications such as file transfer, database transactions are size-fixed tasks 
The optimal behavior of the customer who choose the pay-per-time pricing scheme would 
push them to perform the tasks as soon as possible. However, the customer who chooses pay-
per-volume pricing has task scheduling flexibility, because most of the size fixed tasks are 
divisible, and the customer can schedule a task in different reasonable times. Therefore, we 
assume that there is no difference in the benefit of transmitting data for the both pricing 
scheme. Moreover, the providers will set a lower pay-per-volume unit cost to encourage 
customers to choose volume based pricing since they generally want to prevent bursting. So, 
we can easily assume that x tc x c< . 
 
 
Consumer surplus function 
 
For the consumer who leases the network capacity with the pay-per-time pricing 
strategy 1( )Ω , the total utility is given by ( )r kx wt+ + for 0x >  and 0t > , where r  is the 
reservation price/utility of the consumer, k  is the benefit of transmitting unit volume, and w  
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is the benefit of using the network during the unit time. We also assume that consumers with 
zero usage do not derive any utility. Note that, the consumers lease the network capacity and 
use the network for transmitting and completing their tasks; the overall utility depends on the 
level of total connection time and total volume used. Therefore, the consumer surplus 
function for using the network with the pay per connection time pricing strategy is given by 
utility minus the total charge, that is 
( )1 , , tv x t r r kx wt c= + + −        (1) 
 
Similarly, for the consumer who uses the network capacity with the pay-per-volume 
strategy 2( )Ω , the total utility is given by ( )r kx wtα θ+ +  for 0x > , 0t > , 0 1α≤ ≤  
and 0 1θ≤ ≤ . The parameter α and θ  models the difference in benefit of the network leased 
through time based pricing against volume based pricing. The smaller the value ofα and/orθ , 
the higher is the difference in the benefit of the billing choices. Since the consumer who 
selects volume based pricing can not use excess capacity to transmit simultaneous tasks, the 
utility derived is lower as compared to the consumer who selects connection time based 
pricing scheme. That is, the parameter α and θ  model the consumers’ inclination to choose 
volume based pricing rather than selecting connection time based pricing. In this case, the 
consumer pays a per-volume price xc , and therefore surplus is given by    
( )2 , , xv x t r r kx wt c xα θ= + + −       (2) 
 
Depending on the prices set by the provider and their on task profile, consumers would 
select per-time or per-volume pricing schemes or decide not to enter the market. For the 
network provider the objective is to maximize the profit by suitably setting the prices. In the 
next section, we develop an optimization problem for the network provider.  
 
 
Optimization Problem 
 
The objective for the network provider is to maximize profit by selecting the pay-per-
time pricing, tc and the pay-per-volume pricing, xc . As a function of these prices, consumers 
would make their optimal selection. 
 
Note that 1q  is the demand generated by consumers who prefer to pay per usage time, 
and 2q  is demand due to pay-per-volume. Then, the objective function for the vendor is to 
maximize the (normalized) profit,∏ : 
1 2
( , )t x
t x
c c
Max c q c q= +∏         (3) 
 
In order to derive the expressions for 1q  and 2q , we consider the following cases. First, 
we consider the case when xk c≥ that is, the per-used volume benefit for the consumer 
exceeds the access price per-volume usage, and so all the customers in the market prefer 
using the network. In the second case, we assume that xk c≤ , that is the some customers 
neither choose pay-per-time nor pay-per-volume pricing scheme, so prefer not to use 
networks. The optimal solution for the provider is the maximum of these two cases. 
 
Case 1: xk c≥  
In this case, it is easy to see from (2) that 2 (.)v  is nonnegative. As a result, the 
consumer is better off choosing the pay-per-volume pricing scheme as compared to not to 
entering the market. Therefore, the entire consumer population is covered in this case, that is, 
1 2 1q q+ = , see Figure 2. 
 
When 0t = , we can not talk about any task and network usage, also when 0x = , again 
we can not talk about any task and network usage. That’s why the surface representing the 
frontier at which the consumer is indifferent between pay-per-time and pay-per-volume 
pricing schemes can not pass from the points where 0x = or 0t = .  
 
Most probably the consumers choosing the pay-per-time pricing scheme do not have 
low reservation prices. Because of this reason, the surface representing the frontier at which 
the consumer is indifferent between pay-per-time and pay-per-volume pricing schemes can 
not pass from the points where 0r = . Therefore, the surface connecting the points; 1( ,1,1)x , 
1(1, ,1)t  and 1(1,1, )r  represents the frontier at which the consumer is indifferent between pay-
per-time and pay-per-volume pricing schemes, see Figure 2. Using (1) and (2), from the 
indifference equations, we get: 
 
1 1 11
t xkx w c kx w c xα θ+ + − = + + −  
1 11
t xk wt c k wt cα θ+ + − = + + −  
1 1
t xr k w c r k w cα θ+ + − = + + −  
 
From the above three indifference equations, we obtain 1 1 1,  ,  and x t r  as follows. 
1
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Then, from the volume of the triangular pyramid shown in Figure 2, we get: 
1 1 1 1
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and 2 11q q= −           (8) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Consumer selections for Case 1 
  
Also, since 10 1x≤ ≤ , 10 1t≤ ≤  and 10 1r≤ ≤ , we get: 
(1 ) (1 )tc w θ α≥ − + −          (9) 
(1 ) (1 )t xc w cθ α≤ − + − +         (10) 
(1 )t xc cα≥ − +          (11) 
(1 )t xc w cθ≥ − +          (12) 
 
On substituting q1 and q2 from (7) and (8), respectively into (3), the optimization 
problem is  
3 3
( , )
( 1 ) 6 (1 ) ( 1 )
6 (1 ) 6 (1 )t x
t x t x t x
x tc c
c c c c c cMax
c c
α α α
α α
− − + − − − − += +− −∏    (13) 
 
Subject to   (9) – (12) 
 
Case 2: xk c≤  
In this case, we note that some consumers (with low reservation price r  and high 
usages k  and w ) who choose the pay-per-volume pricing scheme could have negative surplus 
and would therefore not enter the market. Therefore for this case, we could have 1 2 1q q+ < , 
see Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Consumer selections for Case 2  
 
The surface connecting (0,0,0) , 2(1, ,0)t and 2(1,0, )r represents the frontier at which the 
consumer is indifferent between choosing pay-per-volume pricing scheme and not entering 
the market, see Figure 3. Then from the indifference equation, we get:  
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From the above two indifference equations, we obtain 2 2,  and t r  as follows. 
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Then, from the volume of the triangular pyramid shown in Figure 3, we get:  
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Also, 1q is the same as defined in (7), and therefore 
2 1 31q q q= − −          (17) 
 
Since 20 1t≤ ≤  and 20 1r≤ ≤ , the following conditions must hold: 
xc k≥            (18) 
xc k wθ≤ +           (19) 
xc k α≤ +           (20) 
 
 On substituting (7) and (17) into (3), the optimization problem is    
3
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Subject to   (18) – (20) 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Pay-per-volume pricing scheme is the next generation strategy to prevent bursting of 
networks. Such a pricing strategy facilitates leasing the excess capacity to other customers, 
and is particularly useful for those customers having fewer tasks with low total volume or 
having generally size fixed tasks. Thus the provider can increase profit by setting higher price 
by offering pay-per-time pricing scheme to those customers, who really use data networks too 
often, having tasks with more volume or having more time fixed tasks. And the provider can 
charge other customers on pay-per-volume terms when they transmit data with large volume 
occasionally. The main focus of this paper is to show that pay-per-volume is an additional 
option available for the network provider. This is illustrated by the optimization models 
maximizing provider’s profit when pay-per-volume pricing strategy exists, as against when it 
does not exist. In conclusion, this paper shows that (i) the pay-per-volume choice can 
increase the profitability of the network provider, and (ii) when both strategies are used, the 
optimal pricing strategies to maximize the provider’s profit are presented. 
 
 
 
The optimization models in this paper assumed linear pay-per-time and pay-per-volume 
pricing schemes. As future research, we plan to extend it by adding another pricing scheme, 
combination of both pay-per time and volume. Also, we plan to make numerical studies to 
compare pricing schemes and perform sensitivity analysis.        
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